The specific application I’m most familiar with is in the maritime community where pleasure and commercial vessels typically use climatological charts, called pilot charts, in the decision-making process. In the advent of triple La Ninas, climatological data is most likely the weather conditions mariners will not see. The notion that forecast uncertainty plays no part in risk assessment is nearsighted. It’s not the forecast itself that matters, but the potential for higher, unexpected conditions. If that potential exceeds operational limits and it is disregarded, then the mariner is in for trouble.
Case in point is one of the worst maritime disasters in U.S. history, the SS El Faro sinking with all 33 lives aboard lost. The El Faro was a 790-foot commercial cargo ship that departed Jacksonville, FL on September 29, 2015 bound for San Juan, Puerto Rico. The fully loaded ship routinely made this passage. On this occasion, however, Hurricane Joaquin got in the way. Hurricane Joaquin was a Category 3 hurricane that had undergone rapid intensification before it came within close proximity to El Faro. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found the probable cause of the El Faro tragedy was the captain’s insufficient action to avoid Hurricane Joaquin, his failure to use the most current weather information, and his late decision to muster the crew 1. The day before the sinking, the captain charted a course to pass the storm’s eye at a distance of about 65 nm. In this expert’s opinion, 65 nm is too close to pass the center of a hurricane. The 24 hr and 48 hr 5-year mean track errors are 45.0 and 77.1 nm 2 . From this fact, it is apparent the captain had little knowledge of the unpredictability and track errors associated with hurricanes.
- NTSB Docket - Docket Management System
- Berg, R. 2016. Hurricane Joaquin, Tropical Cyclone Report AL112015. Miami, Florida: National Hurricane Center. January 12.

