Maritime Meteorology and Decision Making

The value of having timely weather data and a professional to interpret these weather data and provide forecasts for any particular operation can be life-saving. Whether it be fog on highways reducing visibility and causing multiple vehicle accidents or ships at sea threatened by tropical cyclones, professional expertise can save lives, equipment and property damage. These losses also extend to lost and unnecessary workforce hours in disruption of normal operations. The average person without professional assistance typically looks at weather products from applications that simply pull in direct model output, without expert interpretation or quality-control of that data. At the worst, they look at climatology products which are averages weather parameters over a period of time, presumably 30 years or longer. The mistake often made is that operational decisions are made on these data. A more experienced (not a professional) user may misinterpret weather forecasts or does not realize the significance of obtaining up-to-date forecast aids from a variety of sources. Regardless, nothing can take the place of a certified, professional meteorologist providing input to the decision-making process.

The specific application I’m most familiar with is in the maritime community where pleasure and commercial vessels typically use climatological charts, called pilot charts, in the decision-making process. In the advent of triple La Ninas, climatological data is most likely the weather conditions mariners will not see. The notion that forecast uncertainty plays no part in risk assessment is nearsighted. It’s not the forecast itself that matters, but the potential for higher, unexpected conditions. If that potential exceeds operational limits and it is disregarded, then the mariner is in for trouble.

Case in point is one of the worst maritime disasters in U.S. history, the SS El Faro sinking with all 33 lives aboard lost. The El Faro was a 790-foot commercial cargo ship that departed Jacksonville, FL on September 29, 2015 bound for San Juan, Puerto Rico. The fully loaded ship routinely made this passage. On this occasion, however, Hurricane Joaquin got in the way. Hurricane Joaquin was a Category 3 hurricane that had undergone rapid intensification before it came within close proximity to El Faro. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found the probable cause of the El Faro tragedy was the captain’s insufficient action to avoid Hurricane Joaquin, his failure to use the most current weather information, and his late decision to muster the crew ¹. The day before the sinking, the captain charted a course to pass the storm’s eye at a distance of about 65 nm. In this expert’s opinion, 65 nm is too close to pass the center of a hurricane. The 24 hr and 48 hr 5-year mean track errors are 45.0 and 77.1 nm ² . From this fact, it is apparent the captain had little knowledge of the unpredictability and track errors associated with hurricanes.

1. NTSB Docket - Docket Management System
2. Berg, R. 2016. Hurricane Joaquin, Tropical Cyclone Report AL112015. Miami, Florida: National Hurricane Center. January 12.