It is well established that geomagnetic storms have the potential to threaten the security of electricity supply. For example, on 13 March 1989 a geomagnetic storm induced transformer failure on one of the main power transmission lines in the Hydro Quebec system led to a collapse of the entire power grid (Kappenman and Albertson, 1990; Czech et. al., 1992). More recently, Pulkkinen, Viljanen, and Pirjola. (2004) have observed that the geomagnetic storms in late October 2003 led to significant operational problems for the Swedish power grid.

In this study, we use local magnetometer data to address whether the adverse impacts of geomagnetic storms on power grids are more prevalent than has heretofore been recognized. The analysis in this paper focuses on the impact of space weather on the electricity grid in the Netherlands. System balance in the Netherlands is the responsibility of TenneT, the system operator. TenneT employs a balancing market that clears every 15 minutes. Prices in this market are established through an auction based on the system requirements and previously submitted bids by generators. Under the normal course of events, TenneT resolves negative market imbalances by procuring upward regulating and reserve power. When these balancing instruments are inadequate, it deploys emergency power.

Using a multivariate econometric estimation, the analysis in this paper considers if any of the deployments of emergency power over the period 1 January 2003 through 31 December 2004 can be attributed to geomagnetic activity. The results of the analysis are expected to be of interest to grid operators, policy makers, and space weather researchers.