But first the basics. Because this post concerns wildland fire weather, it is prudent to begin with the recognized Rules of Engagement ("10 & 18") and Entrapment Avoidance principles that specifically relate to fire weather for those Wildland Firefighters (WF), Municipal/Structural Firefighters (FF) engaged in wildland fire, as well as non-WF and FF readers alike.
There are Ten Standard Fire Orders and 18 Watch Out Situations, several of which deal exclusively with wildland fire weather. The first Fire Order states (1) Keep informed on fire weather conditions and forecasts. The three Watch Out Situations as guidelines specifically dealing with wildland fire weather state: (4) Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior, (14) Weather becoming hotter and drier, and (15) Wind increases and/or changes direction. These are primarily addressed in the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG) "establishes standards for wildland fire incident response. The guide provides critical information on operational engagement, risk management, fire environment, all hazard response, and aviation management." The IRPG back page is comprised of these very same tried-and-trued Rules of Engagement.
In reality, because wildland Fire Weather determines fire behavior - from a wildland firefighter perspective - it is safe to say that all the other Watch Out Situations are affected in one way or another by fire weather during each of the firefighting and aircraft operations, even taking a nap near the fireline. Clearly, wildland fire weather determines wildland fire behavior and most wildfires will actually signal their intentions, thus making the knowledge, understanding, and utilization of the Rules of Engagement that much more critical.
The paper will hopefully contribute along with others, to our goal of reducing the number of inevitable wildland fire burnover, entrapments, fire shelter deployments, fatalities, and other tragic mishaps due to "incomplete lessons learned," one of the many notable conclusions derived from Dr. Dianne Vaughan and her extensive published research on the 1986 and 2003 Challenger and Columbia Space Shuttle disasters.

